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Abstract. This paper considers the defense expenditure and economic growth nexus based 
on the cross-border problems and increasing geo-political presence for BRIC blocs over 
the period 1993-2014. Our approach is more methodological in terms of employing Panel 
cointegration and causality to highlight the fundamental relation between the defense 
expenditure and economic growth. Here we emphasize various economic considerations in 
terms of pre and post war, strategic and spatial phenomenon to capture the magnitude of 
gains from the increased defense spending in the region. We are using panel unit-root; 
panel cointegration and panel-Granger causality to highlight the fundamental relationship 
between the variables. We conclude by discussing the issues as well as quantifying the 
consequences of present geostrategic conditions associated with these economies.  
 
Keywords: Defense Expenditure, BRIC, Panel cointegration.  
 
JEL Classification: O39, O50, C22.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XXIII (2016), No. 1(606), Spring, pp. 89-102 
Devi Prasad Dash, Debi Prasad Bal, Manoranjan Sahoo 
	
90 
1. Introduction 
The policy analysts put startlingly different opinions regarding the effect of defense 
expenditure upon the economic growth. Similarly the economists have been estimating 
and putting the analyses regarding efficiency and trade-off of defense expenditure and 
growth differently. One of the key barriers to the mainstream approach in this field is the 
prevalence of misconception regarding its stand from geo-political fronts. Historically, 
the trends of war, defense mechanism, controlling extremism and restoring peace have 
been defined as the geo-political phenomenon. Being characterized as an economic 
approach, the defense and peace mechanisms have come up with certain pioneering 
contributions - Peck and Scherer (1962), Brito (1972), Benoit (1973), Intriligator (1975). 
Some of the papers as cited above have provided the strategic significance to the new 
economic field. Further the applications of asymmetric information and game theory in 
defense economics have made the analysis quite robust (See Handbook of Defense 
Economics Vol-1, Ch-1). Though the attempt has been made to justify the theoretical 
foundation, still it is increasingly complex to satisfy the proposition because of the 
multifarious approaches in terms of strategic, political, domestic, spatial and international 
factors.  
As far as the practical prospects of the existing literature are concerned, the analysis has 
invoked the series of time series, panel studies by focusing on individual economies and 
the regions as the whole. The result derived from this paper suggested that there are long 
relation between defense expenditure and economic growth in the case of BRIC 
countries. Here we confine our analysis to the most important block- BRIC.(1) Except 
growth standpoint, their defense expenditures have been rising over the years due to the 
looming cross-border problems and increasing geo-political presence. 2014 BRIC 
Summit has advocated the needs to propel the defense industries to pursue certain 
common security interests and handle other domestic spheres.  
The post-cold war scenario brought some significant momentum in terms of the 
formation of new blocs based on some common parameters like economic development, 
security interests and strategic affairs. BRIC literally fulfills most of the common 
parameters laid down by Jim O Neill. BRIC economy as a whole shares 11% of global 
GDP in 1990, which further rose to 25% in 2011 and is forecasted to post 40% by 2050.(2) 
The defense component always plays key role in BRIC(3) policy paradigm due to the 
various internal and external factors associated with it. Some factors are Chechnya, 
Ukraine problems of Russia, Naxalism and Kashmir problem of India, Drug war in 
Brazil, Xinjiang problem and ethnic conflicts with China. Further, some conflicting 
interests like Russia-China border crisis, China-India border problems, Silk Route, Geo 
strategic influence in South-East Asia have fueled tensions among the BRIC nations. The 
defense expenditure has been increasing leading to three major reasons - 1) internal 
security 2) border crisis and external issues 3) geo-strategic competition.(4) Among the 
BRIC nations, Russia is the primarily the biggest arm exporter to the rest of the world 
with the larger consumers being from China and India. As per SIPRI report, India is the 
largest importer of arms and ammunitions in the world.(5) With the latest agreements with 
France and American companies regarding the purchase of defense weapons and fighter 
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jets, India’s defense import bill has been swelled to more than $20 billion. China is the 
2nd largest spender in defense sectors behind USA, with a budget tantamount to $ 188 
billion in 2013. It constitutes 1.4% of Chinese GDP.(6) 
Our aim is to undertake the detailed investigation regarding the effect of defense 
expenditure upon the economic growth in BRIC nations. Though previous studies have 
concentrated on analyzing the relation between defense expenditure and growth in a 
considerably bigger panels (Chen et al., 2014; Topcu and Aras, 2015), a very few number 
of studies like (Zhong et al., 2014) have concentrated in terms of smaller panels with the 
notable omissions like BRIC, N-11 nations etc. Here we focus our analysis on a relatively 
shorter and important panel of economies like BRIC. More prominently, with the rising 
income, each of the economies in this bloc has invested heavily in their concerned 
defense sector and also involved heavily in arms, ammunition trading among each other 
as well as with other economies. In 2014-15, India’s defense deals with France, USA and 
Russia are the significant events. Similarly, China has doubled its defense spending in 
last couple of years. Brazilian government is in the process of reviving its defense 
industry in terms of modernization, investments in arms and ammunitions and recruiting 
more defense personnel. Russia has been traditionally largest arms exporter in the world. 
Further, Russia has shaped its defense and other strategic avenues due to the increasing 
threat of proxy war with NATO and to tackle ongoing Ukraine crisis.(7) Here we need to 
see, whether the spectacular growth of 1990s and early 2000s have ascribed to a rising 
defense expenditure in these economies.  
Our paper goes further compared to the other conventional papers of the recent times in 
terms of econometric investigations. We use the BRIC panel data for defense 
expenditures, per capita GDP and Real GDP growth for the estimation. The logic behind 
taking GDP parameters in two forms is to capture the effect of defense expenses on the 
economy as a whole and on the income of the individuals. Further, the notion behind 
adding the per-capita income part is to capture whether increasing per-capita defense 
expenditure has the impact upon the per-capita growth or not.  
The modern literature’s focus on the defense-growth nexus contrasts sharply with the 
traditional theory since Benoit (1973). Recent empirical framework has not found any 
convincing evidences in terms of defense-growth relations across the world. Motivated by 
a wealth of evidences from several studies, we undertake study with respect to BRIC 
nations due to some underlined reasons. First, BRIC region has gained importance 
economically, spatially and strategically due to their roles in world economy. Such a 
defense- growth theory in case of BRIC revolves around two key questions. (a) Why do 
these economies find it optimal to spend more on arms and ammunitions despite their 
persistent failures in achieving their social sectors initiatives? (b) What prompts those 
economies to push for more arms import despite the looming of higher deficit pictures 
(exception in case of Russia being the arms exporter)? Second, this region, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not been studied with respect to defense- growth relation. In the light 
of several issues like Xinjiang problem, Ukraine crisis, South China Sea, India’s border 
issues and other defense deals, it is quite imperative to assess the trend and pattern of 
defense sector’s performance of these economies. Third, rising defense trade and defense 
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deals among BRIC economies in recent BRIC meetings at Fortaleza, 2014 have revived 
the interests of focusing on such mechanism. Fourth, given the importance of the study, 
our empirical findings will give an insight to the issue, which can open up the channels 
for further research on this region irrespective of our results. This study though not a very 
different study, still acts as a building block approach to capture the relative volatility in 
defense spending and capture the stylized trends of unbalanced domestic development in 
these developing economies (Hassan et al., 2003; Yildirim and Öcal, 2006; Narayan and 
Singh, 2007; Hirnissa et al., 2009; Muhanji and Ojah, 2014). 
We consider our paper to complement the existing line of research that relies heavily on 
the long run relationship. The rest of the paper has been organized as follows. Section-2 
summarizes the literatures on effects of defense expenditures on growth of the developed 
and developing economies. Section-3 describes the data and methodology of the study. 
Section-4 discusses the econometric procedures and empirical results. Section-5 
concludes the analysis.  
 
2. Literature review 
Using Benoit (1973) as a starting point, here we have collected a large set of previous 
theoretical and empirical literatures to corroborate in the existing framework. This section 
considers the evidences presented below as the meaningful supplements to our present 
analysis. From this standpoint, establishing the correlation among defense expenditure, 
economic growth and spatial development stand inevitable as far as our analysis is 
concerned.  
Benoit (1978) was one of the pioneering papers in this field, where 44 less developed 
countries were taken into the analysis. The analysis reported the positive relationship 
between defense expenditure and economic growth. Though being a starting point, still 
later analyses are not consistent with the Benoit’s paper. Factors like strategic features, 
geographical constraints, cross-border conditions, extremisms seem to have put 
comparable effects in the financing of defense sectors across the economies. Some non-
traditional determinants like defense cluster, modern artillery exercise turn out to be the 
important factors in popping up the increasing defense expenses. In another seminal 
paper, Deger (1986) found out the negative relation between economic growth and 
defense expenditure in less developed economies. The paper cited the reason that rising 
defense expenditure was the concomitant result of the non-developmental expenditure of 
the economy, which further was unable to channelize it into the productive sources. Post-
cold war literatures notably Ram (1995), Dunne (1996) have augmented the analyses by 
stating negative and no correlation between defense expenditure and growth patterns in 
less developed economies. However, still some studies have reported positive relationship 
(Yildirim and Öcal, 2006; Pradhan, 2010; Shahbaz et al., 2013). Here we have further 
typified the literatures into certain types. 
In this section of literature review, we outline the effect of defense expenditure on 
economic growth by citing some time series specific analysis- mostly individual economy 
based study. This type of study rationalizes and captures the economic specific 
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externalities from defense expenditure, domestic defense spheres, and geo-strategic 
relation with neighbors and internal interactions of social sector parameters. Yildirim and 
Öcal (2006) analyzed the arms race strategies between India and Pakistan. The causality 
approach pinpointed the causal relation between the defense expenditures of India and 
Pakistan, because of arms race and nuclearization of the region. Further, the causal 
relation stated that defense expenditure did granger cause economic growth in India, not 
in Pakistan. A VAR analysis framework emphasized that defense expenditure might have 
certain short run impact on growth but not in long run in case of India. Shahbaz et al. 
(2013) provides a tractable platform of the Portuguese economy by taking trend of 
defense expenditure and economic growth from 1980 to 2010. His framework applied 
ARDL model through which, they found a significant relation between defense 
expenditure and growth rate. In addition, they found the unidirectional causality from 
defense expenditure to growth in Portugal. Ali and Dimtriakis (2014) have studied the 
impact of defense expenditure on economic growth in case of China by undertaking two 
state Markov switching model analysis. Their results pinpointed the fact that defense 
expenditure generally exerted two way effects upon growth rate- positively during boom 
and negatively during slowdown. 
The last ten years have seen an exponential rise in the panel studies of defense- growth-
inequality mechanism. Demonstration of such panel studies are strived to fulfill one such 
objective- to establish the strategic and geo-political importance in the world. Hirnissa et 
al. (2009) empirically examined the relation between defense spending and economic 
growth in ASEAN-5 nations. In case of Singapore, they got bi-directional causality, while 
uni-directional causality was obtained in case of Thailand and Indonesia. No meaningful 
relation was found in context of Malaysia and Philippines. Dunne (2010) has focused 
such an analysis with respect to the Sub-Saharan African nations. His analysis hardly 
found any positive relation between defense spending and economic growth despite being 
those economies frequently involved in war. Pradhan (2010) analyzed the nexus between 
defense expenditure and economic growth in the European Union economies from 1973 
to 2010. The results were showing the strong nexus between defense spending and 
economic growth in the European Union economies. Other promising works with respect 
to the European Union are Kollias et al. (2007). Muhanji and Ojah (2014) have studied 
the panel of highly indebted war-prone African economies. Their analysis has shown the 
positive relation between defense spending and external debt across the nations and also 
during pre-war, war time, and post war periods. Further Topcu and Aras (2015) have 
extended their analysis of previous work on EU nations by adding some new members of 
European Union. Their analysis however refuted the previous results by stating no 
uniform approach in this context. Their analysis discovered the fact that during Post-Cold 
War, defense expenditure had exerted negative impact upon the economic growth in some 
East European economies.  
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3. Empirical Model and Data 
In this study, we used two common proxy for “increasing state expenditure” i.e. 
government defense expenditure and government per capita defense expenditure 
(Narayan et al. (2008). Our panel data model is in the following form: 
ititiiit YX   21ln             (1) 
Where, X represents the defense expenditure and per capita defense expenditure; Y 
represents the proxy for economic growth (real GDP and real per capita GDP). ln denotes 
the natural logarithm form of the variables; and subscript i and t represent the cross-
section countries and time period respectively.  
This study covers 4 emerging countries of the World, i.e. Brazil, Russia, China and India. 
Our study has used annual data covering the period from 1993-2014. We have taken data 
solely from World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The time period taken here 
has been favored by 3 reasonable facts. Firstly, we have taken the full sample of data 
depending upon the availability, and more prominently, the era of globalization has 
brought some spectacular growth in those economies. Secondly, division of Soviet 
Republics has changed the regime from Communism to Capitalism in Russia. As our bloc 
takes into account Russia only, we prefer not to place the defense scenario of Soviet 
Republic prior to 1990. Thirdly, these emerging economies after 1990s have been 
inflicted by several terrorism and separatism movements. Fourthly, in our analysis we 
have deliberately excluded South Africa from the analysis due to certain reasons. A) 
South Africa has comparatively less per capita defense spending compared to its BRIC 
counterparts. B) There are no such cross-border and strategic issues revolved near its 
geographic boundaries. C) More prominently, there is severe discontinuity in South 
Africa’s defense spending data for which we seek to exclude it from our analysis. 
 
4. Methodology and Results 
Panel unit root test 
In this section, this study trace the panel stationary property of the data in order to avoid 
any kind of spurious relation among the variables used in the model. Our dataset includes 
4 variables namely real GDP, real per capita GDP, real defense expenditure and real per 
capita defense expenditure. We used Levin et al. (2002) unit root test and the result is 
presented in Table 1. It is derived from the unit root test is that we are not able to reject 
the null hypothesis of unit root test at the level series of the variables. In other words, all 
the variables are stationary at first difference. The main implication from the finding of 
I(1) of all the variables implies existence of long run relation among these variables. So, 
this study shows the long run relationship between expenditure and economic growth of 
BRIC countries in the next step. 
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Table 1. Result of Unit Root Test 
Variable Intercept Intercept and Trend 
lnGDP 0.50 (0.69) -0.53 (0.29)
ΔlnGDP -2.91 (0.00) -2.23 (0.01)
lnPGDP 0.56 (0.71) -0.57 (0.28)
 ΔlnPGDP -2.67 (0.00) -2.18 (0.01)
lnMXP 0.68 (0.75) 0.67 (0.74)
ΔlnMXP -1.50 (0.06) -1.25 (0.09)
lnPMXP 0.89 (0.82) 0.62 (0.73)
ΔlnPMXP -1.47 (0.07) -1.23 (0.09)
Note: All variables are transformed logarithmically. PGDP and PMXP represent per capita GDP and per 
capita defense expenditure respectively. ∆ indicates the first difference of the series concerned. Probability 
values are reported in the parenthesis. 
 
Panel cointegration test 
Once it is observed panel unit root, then in the next step this study performs a panel 
cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (2004). This test allows for heterogeneity in the 
intercept and slopes of the cointegration equation. In the Pedroni (2004) test conduct 
seven test statistics such as panel v-statistics, panel rho-statistics, panel pp-statistics, 
panel ADF-statistics, group rho-statistics, group PP-statistics and group ADF-statistics. 
So, the panel cointegration regression is as follows: 
ititiiit YX   21ln         (2) 
More specifically, Pedroni (2004) seven test statistics are based on estimated residual i.e. 
ittiiit    )1( . Hence, when the calculated values of these seven test statistics are 
greater than the Pedroni (2004) critical value indicates rejection of null hypothesis. This 
implies existence of long run relation between expenditure and economic growth.  
We report Pedroni (2004) panel cointegration result in Table 2. The result shows, a long 
run relation is captured or not between defense expenditure and economic growth in the 
case of BRIC countries. We frame our model into two parts. Model 1 represents the 
relation between real GDP with real defense expenditure and Model 2 represents the 
relation between real per capita GDP with real per capita defense expenditure of BRIC 
countries. The need for the inclusion of per capita defense expenditure and per capita 
growth are quite imminent because of their relative impact on the economic welfare and 
wellbeing of the individuals.  Many earlier literatures (Pan et al., 2014) have identified 
the fundamental consequences of inequality arising out of excessive defense spending. 
Though we have not solely taken the inequality aspect here, still the inclusion of per 
capita aspects with reference to defense expenditure and growth have been considered 
here to make our analysis more robust and significant.  The first column of the Table 2 
presents the relation between the real defense expenditure as well as real per capita 
defense expenditure and real GDP and real per capita GDP of BRIC countries. The 
second column of the Table 2 present the seven test statistics proposed by Pedroni (2004) 
and the third column present the calculated test statistics.  
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Table 2. Result of Cointegration Test 
Model 1 Test Statistics Calculated Statistics  
lnMXP-lnGDP Panel v-statistics
Panel rho-statistics 
Panel pp-statistics  
Panel ADF-statistics 
Group rho-statistics 
Group pp-statistics 
Group ADF-statistics 
3.20 (0.00)
-5.03 (0.00) 
-7.54 (0.00) 
-2.64 (0.00) 
-3.15 (0.00) 
-6.27 (0.00) 
-2.87 (0.00) 
Model 2 Test Statistics Calculated Statistics 
lnPMXP-lnPGDP Panel v-statistics
Panel rho-statistics 
Panel pp-statistics  
Panel ADF-statistics 
Group rho-statistics 
Group pp-statistics 
Group ADF-statistics 
-3.19 (0.05)
-4.98 (0.00) 
-7.39 (0.00) 
-2.53 (0.00) 
-3.07 (0.00) 
-6.09 (0.00) 
-2.72 (0.00) 
Note: Figure in parenthesis shows the p-value, MXP = real defense expenditure, PMXP = per capita defense 
expenditure, GDP= real economic growth, PGDP = real per capita economic growth. 
 
The result derived from the Table 2 clearly show that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration between real defense expenditure and real economic growth as well as real 
per capita defense expenditure and real per capita economic growth reject in all of the 
Pedroni (2004) test statistics. In Brazil, the per capita GDP (7.923) from 1993 has risen 
to (9.35) in 2014. Similarly the per capita defense spending (3.80) from 1993 has 
increased to 5.04 in 2014 due to the drug war as well as some defense deal with some 
developed economies (all values in brackets are logarithmically transferred). Russia in the 
similar fashion has improved its defense position by reflecting its geo-strategic 
significance and initiative to counter to NATO. India with a rising growth prospective 
(5.72 in 1993 to 7.37 in 2014) has also been facing the internal threats as well as spatial 
induced terrorism (separatist problems) and maritime piracy problems.(8) China has 
uniquely established its identity by employing geo-strategic influence over South China 
Sea and imminent problems with Japan, Taiwan and other southern neighbors. China’s 
per capita defense spending has been increasing exponentially from 2.37 in 1993 to 5.06 
in 2014. 
 
Panel long run test 
Once we find a long run relation between defense expenditure with economic growth, in 
the next step, this study shows the long run effect of real economic growth with real 
defense expenditure. This study used dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) proposed by 
Kao and Chiang (2000), which includes leads and lags of the ‘independent’ variables to 
show the long run effect among them. The merit of DOLS over ordinary least square 
(OLS) and fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) explained by Kao and Chiang 
(2000) that OLS and FMOLS are biased up to N = 60 and T = 60 and hence DOLS is 
superior to OLS and FMOLS in all the case. We report the result of DOLS in Table 3. We 
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present the result of DOLS in the case of two models. Model 1 shows the long run effect 
of real economic growth on real defense expenditure and the model 2 shows the long run 
effect of real per capita economic growth on real per capita defense expenditure.   
Table 3. Result of DOLS Test 
Dependent variables are lnMXP and lnPMXP for Model 1 and Model 2 respectively 
 Model 1 Model 2
Constant lnGDP Constant lnPGDP 
Coefficient 
Std. Error 
Prob. 
-0.60 
1.09 
0.58 
0.86
0.002 
0.00 
-3.22
0.25 
0.00 
0.54 
0.001 
0.00 
Note: All variables are transferred into the logarithmic terms. 
The result derived from Table 3 finds that real GDP positively affects to the real defense 
expenditure. More specifically, 1% change in real GDP, ceteris paribus, leads to raise 
0.86% in real defense expenditure. Similarly, this study finds a positive relation between 
real per capita GDP to real per capita defense expenditure- 1% rise in real per capita 
GDP leads to raise 0.54% in real per capita defense expenditure. If we look at 20 year 
time span, except China, rest of the economies have experienced minor decrease in the 
real defense expenditure, although their per capita defense spending has increased 
significantly. Similarly, real GDP over 20 years for BRIC economies have also increased 
significantly. 
Table 4. Average trend of total defense expenditure as percent to GDP 
Country 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2013 
Brazil 1.779 1.709 1.572 1.481 1.394 
Russia 4.442 3.589 3.72 3.698 4.124 
India 2.649 2.842 2.724 2.624 2.488 
China 1.972 1.846 2.09 2.053 2.01 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. 
 
Table 5. Growth rate of real GDP for the BRIC countries 
Country 1992-1996 
 
1997-2001
 
2002-2006
 
2007-2011
 
2012-2013 
Brazil -0.317 -0.12 0.073 0.136 -0.096 
Russia -0.375 -0.214 0.13 0.062 -0.013 
India -0.012 -0.018 0.093 0.051 -0.085 
China 0.038 0.089 0.138 0.182 0.097 
 Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank. 
Further, this study conducted a panel Granger Causality test to observe the direction of 
causality between the real defense expenditure and real GDP; real per capita defense 
expenditure and real per capita GDP. As panel Granger Causality test shows the short run 
relation between the variables, therefore, this study capture the speed of adjustment or 
ECMt-1 term through Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel generalized method of moment 
(GMM) (Narayan et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 2008). We report the result in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Panel Granger Causality Result 
 Model 1 Model 2
dlnMXP dlnGDP ECMt-1 dlnPMXP dlnPGDP ECMt-1 
dlnMXP 
dlnGDP 
------
5.88 (0.00) 
3.90 (0.23)
------ 
-0.78 (0.00)
-0.76 (0.00) 
------ ------- ------- 
dlnPMXP 
dlnPGDP 
------- ------- ------- ------
5.92 (0.00) 
3.99 (0.00) -0.80 (0.00) 
-0.77 (0.00) 
Note: Figure in parenthesis shows the p-value, MXP = real defense expenditure, PMXP = per capita defense 
expenditure, GDP= real economic growth, PGDP = real per capita economic growth. 
 
The result of short run Granger causality is derived from the difference of the variables 
and the long run causality between the variables is observed from one period lag of error 
correction term (Narayan et al., 2012 and Bal and Rath, 2015). From the Table 6, it finds 
that there is unidirectional short run relation between real GDP to real defense 
expenditure for the BRIC countries. In addition to short run relation, we find significant 
ECMt-1 term which indicates existence of bidirectional relation between them in the long 
run. However, this study finds bidirectional causality between real per capita GDP and 
real per capita defense expenditure in the short run as well as in the long run in the case 
of BRIC countries.   
Summary of the results 
We set out another illustration of our notion of defense-growth nexus through the channel 
of a detailed empirical framework. Our main finding is quite interesting in terms of 
providing a strong and significant correlation among the variables of defense expenditure 
and growth rate.  
In our analysis, initially we test the Pedroni cointegration, where almost all the 7 statistics 
have rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables. The economies 
in the bloc have profoundly favored this aspect, if we study their distinctive geo-strategic, 
defense and security initiatives over the period from 1990s to till date. Incidents like 
maritime piracy, continuous terrorist threats, separatists’ movements, extremist activities, 
border disputes and other random factors like territorial disputes have infused these 
economies to strengthen their defense mechanisms. Further, our panel DOLS analysis 
reflects the positive associations among the variables in the region. Every 1% rise in the 
economic growth has contributed nearly 0.54% rise in real defense expenditure, with the 
highest rise in case of China (0.60%). Despite the persistence of certain degree of 
skewedness in Brazilian defense spending, still a high correlation persists among the rest 
3 superpowers (India, China, Russia) in terms of defense spending and economic growth. 
Russia is the leading arms exporter in the region, from which India and China are 
purchasing weapons over the years. Recent BRIC summit 2014 at Fortaleza has called for 
a BRIC defensive wall against the imminent external threat in the region. In addition to 
this, our Panel Granger result has reflected the bidirectional short run and long run 
causality among the variables. The causality test formally attributes to the fact that these 
variables are not only causally related in the long run, but also in short run. Many 
insignificant events in the short run like territorial disputes, defense deals have led to the 
significant rise in defense spending in these economies. Many prominent and unsolved 
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incidents like fundamentalism, terrorism have prompted these economies to adopt a 
collective long term strategy in the region, ultimately resulting in huge defense spending. 
Though this analysis has altogether got a significant relation among defense spending and 
growth rate, still it questions the ethos of such mechanism regarding which we are silent. 
We even baffle by such mechanism, whether a particular uniform threshold exists for 
defense spending or not in case of emerging economies.  
 
5. Conclusion and future implication 
Many interesting features of defense and economic growth are dynamic in nature because 
of present day’s changing dynamics. In recent years, a large number of literatures have 
come up with different dimensions of economic growth by correlating with the defense 
mechanism. Using the empirical framework, we investigate the effect of defense spending 
upon the economic growth in so called BRIC bloc from 1993-2014. We primarily argue 
the essence of our study by using cointegration and causality tests. Cointegration tests 
show that there is a long run relation between defense expenditure and economic growth. 
We further apply Panel DOLS to show the long run effect of economic growth with 
defense expenditure. 1% change in real growth rate has attributed to 0.86% change in real 
defense expenditure in the region. Similarly the study finds the 0.54% change in per 
capita defense expenditure due to 1% change in economic growth. Further the application 
of Panel Granger causality test shows the short run relation among the variables and 
application of error correction mechanism reflects the long run bidirectional causality 
between the variables.  
Through more sophisticated tools and highly detailed datasets, defense economists 
already reach a consensus that expansion of defense sector and economic growth are 
causally related with each other. Here our analysis shows a positive and significant 
relation among the variables, as found in many earlier literatures. The strategies used in 
this analysis leave open some innate possibility of researching further in this type of 
emerging bloc. A new insight may be gained in this BRIC region by exploring more 
options in the field of defense economics. Indeed, there is a more fundamental normative 
question persisting in case of emerging blocs after 1990s- should the emerging economies 
assign a tradeoff between social sector and defense sector spending in the name of 
growth. It is still highly controversial, how optimally the developing economies should 
spend and maintain their payoffs irrespective of their domestic and external scenarios. By 
looking at BRIC, each economy has been highly susceptible both domestic and external 
threats mostly in forms of separatism and terrorism. Furthermore, it is suggested here that 
given the financial backup of the respective government, defense spending can either be 
good or bad depending upon the time and spatial specific conditions. 
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Notes 
	
(1) Here we exclude South Africa from our analysis due to the fact that South Africa’s defense 
expenses are far lesser than the rest four economies in this bloc. It’s defense expenditure to 
GDP ratio is lesser than that of BRIC Economies.  
(2) Please See, “BRICS and the Global Economy” by B.R. Prasad - ORF Online Paper.  
(3) South Africa has been excluded due to its relatively less share of defense expenses to that of 
world’s defense expenditure. Its share is comparatively lesser than those of other BRICS 
members.  
(4)  Please refer to-www.novinite.com/articles/162111/Are+the+BRICS+Putting+Up+a+Defensive 
+Wall%3F 
(5)  For more, see SIPRI Report 2014.  
(6) See Military Balance Press Report, 2014 by IISS.  
(7) Please See Cooper, 2013 report on “Russian Military Expenditure- Data and Facts”. 
(8) Maritime piracy is an act of criminal violence at sea. This problem is more prominent in the 
Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and some parts of Caribbean Sea. A joint military effort is needed 
by these 4 BRIC economies to combat such crisis because these are the important international 
waterways for trade. For more, Please refer to UNODC Report, 2014 on Maritime Crime.  
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